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Chapter pages in book: (p. 49 - 57)How is one to account for the illusion in Germany or elsewhere?
Observers agree on the great flow of women into industry in all three
countries.Yet analysis indicates that the increase in the female
labor force propensity was invariably small or negligible, whether
the comparison is with the number of women already in industry or
with the number of men withdrawn from the civilian population.
Here is a field, apparently, in which direct and unchecked observa-
tion can easily mislead.One part of the so-called rise in the labor
force is merely the absorption of the female unemployed.Another
part results from fixing attention on war industries, traditionally
men's industries, where apparent inflow into the labor force may be
really the transfer of women from agriculture, domestic service, and
retail trade.5°Even in these industries, women stand out
in wartime, not always because of the influx of females but because of
the exodus of males.
Statistically, too, there has been much opportunity for illusion.Ex-
cept for Germany, war and prewar comparisons have been made
among employment (not labor force) figures of large firms in war
industries.Increases are noted in female employment usually with-
out noting also the growth in population, the fall in unemployment,
or the transfer from industries not covered by statistics.The re-
sulting are then inflated by applying the erroneous percentage
increases to the firms and industries.It must be con-
cluded that, actually, none of the three countries discussed was able
to add more than slightly to the normal male civilian labor force
from this source. The greatest net loss from a civilian labor force,
by 1916anyway,was suffered by Germany (18-20 per cent).Great
Britain, by 1918, had suffered a net loss of 10-13 per cent; and the
United States one of 7-10 per cent.The order of these losses is
roughly the order of the extent of mobilization, which had been, for
Germany, one-third; for Great Britain, one-fourth; for the United
States, one-tenth of the normal labor force. To the extent that these
net losses were made up at all, it was by more intensive use of the
diminished civilian labor force.
8THE AMERICAN LABOR FORCE IN WORLD WAR II
(With Some British and German Comparisons.)
Though the statistics, when examined critically, do not show much
of a rise in total labor force propensity during World War I, a good-
50Inmany cases the industries from which women transfer simply close down.
[49Jsized rise during World War II cannot be doubted (App. B).Little
or no net increase took place during the two years before the United
States entered the war, despite fuller employment.During 1942
and 1943, however, there was a rise of nearly 6 million men and
women, of whom more than four-fifths came in independently of the
growth in the working-age population and constituted the rise in
labor force propensity from 49.9 to 54.3 per cent (App. B) that here
concerns us.Of this four-fifths (nearly 5 million persons), slightly
more than two million were women, all but a quarter of whom were
25andolder.5'More than two and a half million were men, all
but a fifth of whom were 24 or younger. The rise in the war labor
force propensity was thus dominated by young men and older women.
It is significant, though often overlooked, that the absolute increase
of males was greater than that of females, which could happen pre-
sumably only in the United States with its large male high school
and college enrollment.
Readers are cautioned that these increases and their age-sex group
details are merely approximations, for the Census is revising its
1940-43 monthly labor force estimates (see App. C). Preliminary re-
visions published recently by the Census, however, show substantially
the same absolute increases in the male and female labor force figures
in November 1943 over December 1941 as were shown in the
original estimates (see Table 17).
But how can these big rises in the labor force propensity during
World War II be explained, in view of the apparent absence of any
significant rise during World War I? To be sure, the percentage
of the normal labor force drafted for military service has been much
greater in this war (Table 18), and a draft of soldiers may be ex-
pected to pull men from school or idleness into the war labor force.
Of the men involved in the rise of labor propensity in the first year
of World War II a million were, we have seen, of school-age.The
monthly poli data may be used to measure the drop from Febru-
ary 1942 to February 1943 of about 1,200,000 in the number of males
outside the labor force and in school.Detailed estimates, based on
my own sample survey of 8 city school systems and 30 colleges and
universities, indicate that this decline had been about evenly dis-
tributed between high school and college level, but that the fall in
female school enrollment had hardly touched the higher institutions
(Table 19).
The decline in school attendance in my estimate is less than that
[50)TABLE 17
Changes in the Male and Female Labor Force, United States, 1941-1943
Comparisons of Original Monthly Poll Estimates with
Preliminary Revisions by the Census
(millions)
TOTAL LABOR FORCE
CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE (including armed forces)
ORIGINAL PRELIMINARY ORIGINAL PRELIMINARY
ESTIMATES REVISIONS ESTIMATES REVISIONS
Change Change Change Change
Number from 1941Number from 1941 Number from 1941 Numberfrom 1941
MALE
1941
Dec. 40.2 .. 40.3 42.2 .. 42.3
1943
Nov. 35.6 —4.6 35.1 —5.2 45.6+3.4 45.1+2.8
FEMALE
1941
Dec. 13.8 .. 14.6
1943 Sameas
Nov. 16.3+2.5 17.5+2.9 Civilian Labor Force
MALE AND FEMALE
1941
Dec. 54.0 .. 54.9 56.0 .. 56.9
1943
Nov. 51.9 —2.1 52.6 —2.3 61.9+5.9 62.6+5.7
SOURCES: Original estimates from Appendix B; revision from The Labor Force, Feb.
1944. For sources of data on the armed forces see Appendix B.
Since females in the armed forces have been too few to justify classification, they were
included in the civilian labor force.
51 Bureau of the Census, The Labor Force Bulletin, Sept. 30, 1943, pp. 10-11; Monthly
Labor Review, March 1943 and Jan. 1944.
registered in the monthly poii estimates, for two reasons. The more
important is that monthly poii data register a drop not merely in
attendance but also in the number of students attending school and
not working part time.The second is that my sample of colleges
TABLE 18
Armed Forces as a Percentage of the Normal Civilian Labor Force
United States, World War I and II
WORLD WAR I WORLD WAR II
1941 June 2.6
1917 Apr. .5 1941 Dec. 3.7
1942 June 6.4
1918 May 5.3 1943 Jan. 12.5
1918 Nov. 10.0 1943 Nov. 18.2
My estimates of the armed forces exclude armed forces normally outside the continental
United States (200,000). Normal civilian labor force 1941-43 computed by multiply-
ing the working-age population for each month by the civilian labor force propensities
in 1940 (51 per cent in the summer months and 48 per cent in the winter months).
[51)and universities represents only the most stable institutions and does
not reflect the attendance at colleges going out of existence.
TABLE 19
in School Enrollment, Males and Females 14-24, by Age Groups
United States, World War I and II
(thousands)
MALE FEMALE
14-17 18-24 14-24 14-17 18.2414.24
WORLD WAR I
October
1916-17 —210 —65 —275 —25+55 +30
1916-18 —180 —10 —190 —155nochange —155
WORLD WAR II
February
1941-42 —200 —150 —350 —110 —30 —140
1941-43 —450 —420 —870 —265 —90 —355
SOURCES:Forestimates of school enrollment 1916-18 see Sec. 2.
For World War lithe sample included senior high schools of 8 city school systems
covering 340,000 boys and girls; and 30 colleges and universities covering about
175,000 male and female students. The data had to be obtained by correspondence.
Incidentally, the greater relative decline in this war may have
less unfortunate effects upon our educational program, because school
enrollment, relative to the school-age population, was about a quarter
higher than at the outbreak of World War I, and the country could
more easily absorb such a loss. A large part of the addition to the
labor force has other explanations, for half was made up of women
over 24 and men over 54.The reasons why relatively so many older
persons, especially women, entered the labor force in this war are
elementary enough.Labor force propensities of males were some-
what lower in 1941 than in 1916; therefore, some labor force
propensity might be said to have been in reserve.Even supposing
the 1941 propensities were held down by the old age security and
relief system, the reserves of this year would be more easily brought
onto the market than would reserves made up of bigger proportion of
hardcore unemployables and very old persons, such as characterized
1.9 16, when male labor force propensities were higher.
The influx of females during World War II may have been the
consequence of inductions of single and childless married men over
24 and the relatively few young children to be cared for.The ab-
solute number of children under 10, as we observed, was no larger
in 1941 than in 1917, and the proportion per 1,000 women 14 and
(52)older had fallen from 642 in 1917to425in1941.52Yetby Pearl
Harbor the female labor force propensity had never risen as high
as the drop in the number of children the average woman had to care
for would have 'allowed'.If the 1917 ratio of 642 children per
1,000 women may be said to have 'allowed' a labor force propensity
of 23.5 per cent for women 14 and older, then the ratio before Pearl
Harbor of 425 would have 'allowed' a propensity of 35.5 per cent.
But the labor force propensity of January 1942 was still only 25.5
per cent.Accordingly, the reserve propensity of that time may have
amounted to as much as 10 per cent. If so, 5,000,000 women may
have been potentially available for the labor force, given the neces-
sary pressure and opportunity. A year later the female labor force
propensity had risen to reducing the 'reserve' to 6 per cent,
or 3,000,000 women.
Both pressure and opportunity had been. set up during the in-
tervening year by the large draft of men from the civilian labor force.
Not only was the draft heavier, relative to the normal labor force,
during the first year of World War II than during entire World War
I; it probably took also a somewhat larger proportion of older and
married men.54Its effectiveness in bringing replacements into the
civilian labor force during 1942 is as striking as its ineffectiveness
in doing so in 1943.
Up to the end of 1942 the cumulative drain of men 20-44 from
the civilian labor force to the military services had virtually been
replaced by the cumulative additions of females 10 and older and of
males under 20 and over 44 (Table 20).This replacement was
not always regular; in some quarters it ran behind the losses, and
in others, it ran ahead.Moreover, that section of the labor force
from which the replacements were drawn was rather larger than that
from which the losses were taken, so that a very small part of the re-
52 Based on 1930.40 comparisons, the percentage of married women without children
must have risen correspondingly.
PERCENTAGE OF MARRIED WOMEN 18-44 WITHOUT CHILDREN UNDER 10
193037i(Bureau of the Census, Series P.9, No. 13 North East
Central Division)
194045.5(Ibid., Series P-18, No. 13 (U. S., Married women,
husband present))
Recent preliminary revisions of the monthly poli estimates suggest that the propen-
sities at these dates were somewhat higher: 27.5 per cent in January 1942, and 28.9 per
cent in January 1943. If these revisions are correct, the reserve propensities would have
involved 3.75 million females at our entry into the war and 2.5 million a year later.
In World War I 90 per cent of all married registrants were deferred (Provost Mar.
shall General, Second Report, 1919, p. 117).
1:53)placement was the result of the differential population increase.
Nevertheless, the contrast is sharp between the strong replacement
effect of 1942 and the negligible replacement effect of 1943.The
contrast is sharpened by the fact that two-thirds more men were
added to the armed forces in the earlier than in the later year. What
then is the explanation for the occurrence of a replacement effect in
the first year of this war but not in the second?
TABLE 20




CHANGE FROM CHANGE FROM 3D
CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE PRECEDING QUARTER QUARTER OF 1941
MALES ALL MALES ALL MALES ALL
TOTAL 20-44 OTHERS 20-44 OTHERS 20-44 OTHERS
Adj. for Adj. for Adj. for Adj. for
Unadj.SeasonalUnadj.1Seasonal2 Unadj.SeasonalUnadj.Seasonal
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1941
III 55.9 54.5 23.1314 .. -. • •-
IV 54.1 54.4 22.9 31.5 —.2 +-1 —.2 +.1
1942
I 53.7 55.0 22.5 32.4 —.4 +.9 —.6+1.0
H 54.7 54.5 21.8 32.7 —.7 +.3 —1.3 +1.3
III 55.7 54.2 21.1 33.1 —.7 +.4 —2.0+1.7
IV 54.0 54.3 19.9 34.4 —1.2+1.3 —3.2+3.0
1943
I 52.2 53.5 18.6 34.9 —1.3 +-5 —4.5+3-5
II 53.2 53.1 18.2 34.8 —.4 —.1 —4.9+3-4
III 54.6 53.2 18.0 35.1 —.2 -1-3 —5.1 +3-7
51.9 51.9 17.7 34.2 —.3 —.9 —5.4+2.8
souRcEs:Unadjusted data: The Labor Force, The Labor Force Bulletin, and the
MonthlyLabor Review.
Adjusted data: Seasonal index was computed from monthly data on total
civilian labor force, April 1940-November 1943: January, 97; February, 98;
March, 98; April, 98; May, 100; June, 103; July, 104; August, 104;
September, 100; October, 99; November, 100; December, 99.
I am grateful to Geoffrey H. Moore and Gerhard Bry for the seasonal adjustments and
for other suggestions concerning this table.
1 No seasonal adjustment was considered necessary. 2 Column 2 minus column 3.
November figures taken to represent the quarter.
To some extent, of course, the loss of primary wage earners in
1942 eased the entry into the labor force of previously submarginal
employables,55 whereas by 1943 this class of person had been largely
For the elderly males outside the labor force in peacetime, the lowered employability
standards were doubtless the chief factor. This explanation may surprise those who
[54)absorbed, if the low level of unemployment is any indication. Again,
in 1942acompelling factor was the combination of the pressure of
a threatened reduction of living standard plus a release from domestic
duties of females whose husbands, sons, or brothers were drafted,
or of girls who would have married and set up housekeeping had the
draft not intervened; during 1943, on the other hand, a much larger
percentage of the draftees were older men with children born since
the start of the war. The wives of these men were not as free to
enter the labor force as were the younger, childless women; moreover,
the pressure on them to do so was relieved by the substantial in-
crease in soldier dependency allowances. The same factor will play
a larger role when men with older and more children are drafted.
Moreover, as pointed out below, an increase in overtime work in
industry and a decrease in commercial services for the home put a
greater domestic burden on wives whose husbands are in civilian
industry, discouraging their entrance into the labor market.
The behavior of German and British labor force propensities in
World War II is an interesting contrast to that of the United States
propensities just reviewed. However, it must be remembered that
the prewar labor force propensities appear to have been much higher
in Germany and Great Britain. As was also observed in Section 6,
so far as these differences were real and not due (as in Germany) to
differences in the census classification of farm housewives, they arose
from far smaller school attendance and fewer children to care for.
For the study of the behavior of the German and British propensi-
ties wartime statistics are meager, and the few we have cannot be
checked.Nevertheless, in both countries figures for 1942 have been
published that probably do not underestimate their labor forces, for
they were intended to make the extent of labor force mobilizations
appear in the most formidable light. The British data are those Mr.
Bevin announced in the House of Commons.In May 1942, ac-
cording to those figures, there were 22,000,000 full-time workers em-
ployed or under arms in Great Britain, not counting domestic serv-
(note 55 conci.)
expect that, for a group living on fixed incomes, insurance benefits, annuities, pensions,
bond interest, and so on, price inflation would provide the chief compulsion to enter
the labor force. This does not seem to have been the case. The percentage rise in the
labor force propensity of the group 55 and older, or even 65 and older, has, in fact,
been very small despite the large percentage rise in the cost of living.
Future price inflation may fetch a few elderly men into the labor force, but not
many. Indeed, whether the opportunity or pressure factor is stronger, any early return
of the elderly group to the propensity levels prevailing before World War I is unlikely.ants, persons unemployed, and persons overin the labor
all of which I estimate to have been not more than In
addition, there were then about 500,000 married women engaged in
part-time work.58 Thus probably not more than 24,000,000 persons
were under arms and in the civilian labor force full or part time—
64.8 per cent of the working-age population.Mr. Bevin said this
represented the maximum possible mobilization of the British popu-
lation.59Yet from 1931 to May 1942 the rise in the labor force
propensity had brought in only 4 per cent of persons 14 and older,
less than the 4½ per cent rise for the United States between De-
cember 1941 and November 1943.
German figures for males present insoluble problems connected
with foreign workers, prisoners, military mobilization, and war losses.
According to statistics given in The Economist, March 6, 1943, from
uncited German sources, 2,200,000 women, including conscripts
for compulsory labor service and 'helpers.' in the Wehrmacht, had
been brought into employment from the labor reserve existing in
August 1939.60 About the same addition can be figured from social
insurance statistics quoted from the Reichsarbeitsblatt.6' Of German
females 14 and older 6.5 per cent were probably added to the labor
force compared with an addition for the United States between De-
cember 1941 and November 1943 of 4.3 per cent and for Great
Britain up to May-October 1942 of 7.4 per cent.°2
"Thus, it is obvious that only married women are available [in Germany) in
66 Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, May 21, 1942, col. 427-8.
A very rough calculation extrapolated from 1931 census data.
58 An estimate based on his speech a year later, when he said, "Over 600,000 women
are doing part-time BritishSpeechesof the Day (British Information Services,
July 1943), p. 24.
These figures were substantially the same in the spring of 1943, when 23,000,000
full-time (including the armed forces) and 600,000 part-time workers were reported
as employed. A 25,000,000 figure, often reported, covers persons in volunteer work.
See MonthlyLaborReview, July 1943, pp. 17-9, and BritishSpeechesof the Day, July
1943, p. 24.
60 The area to which these increases are supposed to apply includes Austria and
Sudetenland, but not territorial additions since 1939. The population to which the ad-
ditions apply covers farm housewives, but not war prisoners or foreign labor. The pur-
pose of citing the increases is to show the extent to which Germany mobilizes her
native population.
61 The Economist,July4, 1942, pp. 16-7; International Labour Review, Montreal, Oct.
1942, p. 462. A colleague has expressed the opinion that these increases were mere re-
flections of territorial accretions to the Reich.
62 Assuming no change in the male labor force propensity from 1931 to 1942. If the
male propensity increased slightly, as it may well have done, the British increase in
female propensity must have been even smaller.
[56)large numbers. Married women without children or with one child, have al-
ready been drawn into some kind of war work. To employ married women
with two or more children in industry makes it necessary toestablish more
kindergartens and other services which need buildings, furniture and per-
sonnel. Part-time work, however, can be organized for considerable numbers
of married women." The Economist, March 6, p. 300.
The British and German figures do show greater increases in
labor force propensities of females than do the United States figures.
But the rise in the labor force propensity of males in the United States
during the war has probably far exceeded that in either Britain or
Germany: 5 per cent of all males 14 and older came into the labor
force between December 1941 and November 1943.
In short, the United States labor force propensity for males and
females combined had risen more after 23 months of war63 than the
British after almost three years, assuming, of course, that the British
propensity did not change materially between 1931 and 1939. It is
possible, as Mr. Bevin claimed, that the British have mobilized their
population for greater output over more hours than has any other
people at any other time.°4But so far as paid labor is concerned,
mobilization has been largely of the time and energy of persons al-
ready in the labor force before the war. There is no evidence of any
big increase in the labor force itself.
9 FOR FURTHER INCREASES
IN THE UNITED STATES LABOR FORCE
As suggested by Mr. Bevin, the propensity of the British population
to be in the labor force as soldier or worker attained its maximum in
1942: 70 per cent of Britons 14-65. In contrast, in the United States
in late 1943 it was only 60 per cent.65 At first blush this country seems
to have still a long way to go before reaching its maximum. The
question whether many additional persons can be brought into the
labor force is especially interesting in view of the United States. pro-
gram to induct more than a million men in 1944.
The higher propensity in Britain did not begin with the war.
Associated both with the traditionally smaller percentage of British
children 14 and older in school and with the smaller percentage of
British women with children under 14., it exceeded that in the United
63 For remarks regarding recent census revisions of monthly poii estimates, see Sec. 8;
see also Table 17 and App. C.
64 Parliamentary Debates, May 21,1942, col.428.
65 On the basis of recent preliminary revisions of the Census poii for 1941-43, the U.S.
labor force propensity in late 1943 was 1 per cent higher than this.
i: 57)